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THE LESSON OF LOPEZ: THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF
FEDERALISM'S POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated
nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself.'
With one fateful sentence in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,' the Supreme Court gave institutional credence to a
strand of federalism theory whose fortunes had waxed and waned
since the Constitution's inception. 3 Garcia marked the end of a two-
decade-long struggle by the High Court over how best to protect state
governments from excessive congressional regulation. 4 The majority
alluded to the views of the Framers, suggesting that "the structure of
the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of
the States."'5  This familiar notion was perhaps best captured thirty
years earlier by Professor Herbert Wechsler's ethereal phrase "The Po-
litical Safeguards of Federalism."'6  Although Professor Wechsler and
his disciples have proven unable to articulate what precisely those
safeguards are and how they protect the states, 7 the notion that
the states somehow occupy a special position in our federal system
I Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
2 469 U.S. 528.
3 See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45-46 James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (I954).
4 See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 (i975); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
5 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 55i.
6 See Wechsler, supra note 3.
7 See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Professor Wechsler
... predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with current reality....
Not only is the premise of this view clearly at odds with the proliferation of national legislation
over the past 30 years, but 'a variety of structural and political changes occurring in this century
have combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values."' (quoting
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM:
POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 50 (1984))). Even some modern-day champions of
"political safeguards" recognize that "few of those who cite [Wechsler's] piece approvingly today
have actually read or thought about it very carefully" and that "[m]any of the arguments are, as
Wechsler's critics have long insisted ... , flawed and unpersuasive." Larry D. Kramer, Putting
the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, ioo COLUM. L. REV. 215, 218
(2o00). Professor Kramer's "restoration" of the political safeguards of federalism has attracted
criticism of its own, as discussed infra p. 6 17.
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continues to serve as Exhibit A in the struggle against judicial en-
forcement of federalism.8
Garcia could be considered the high-water mark for political safe-
guards' proponents due to its explicit refusal to engage in substantive
judicial review, hinged upon a blind faith in the political process to
cure infringements of states' rights. 9 But its revolution was short-
lived. The Garcia dissent's warning of "[t]he hydraulic pressure inher-
ent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of
its power" 10 proved prophetic. Without the realistic prospect of judi-
cial review to rein in Congress, the next decade saw federal power
grow at the expense of the states, up to and beyond Congress's consti-
tutional limits. Not until 1995 did the Court emphatically reenter the
field of substantive judicial review with its decision in United States v.
Lopez," which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199ol2
for reaching beyond Congress's commerce power and into the sphere
of regulation constitutionally reserved to the states.13
Lopez is a powerful rejoinder to those who believe the constitu-
tional division of power between Washington and the states is ade-
quately protected by the political process alone. The majority recog-
nized that judicial enforcement of federalism principles "may in some
cases result in legal uncertainty," but that any benefit gained by the
elimination of judicial review "would be at the expense of the Consti-
tution's system of enumerated powers."'1 4 In this sense, Lopez suggests
a more nuanced understanding of the holding in Garcia: When the leg-
islation in question is clearly within Congress's enumerated powers,
the political process may be the appropriate mechanism to determine
whether the issue is best dealt with at the federal or state level. But
8 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 175 (ig8o) ("The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting
the ultimate power of the national government vis-A-vis the states; rather, the constitutional issue
of whether federal action is beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates
'states' rights' should be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being relegated to the political
branches - i.e., Congress and the President."); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-
a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1556-57 (i977).
9 Cf. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV.
88i, 932 (1986) ("Our traditions would suggest an independent institutional problem with the fed-
eral judiciary as a primary lawmaker. Our system has been that the balance between the states
and the federal government is to be adjusted primarily through Congress, where state interests
are represented, and not through the politically insulated federal judiciary." (citing Garcia, 469
U.S. 528)).
10 Garcia, 469 U.S. at S65 (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12 Pub. L. No. 1o-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844.
13 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
14 Id. at 566.
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the political process alone is an inadequate sentry to guard the consti-
tutional boundary established by Article I.
This Note explores that truth in greater detail by analyzing criti-
cally the role of political safeguards at the frontier of constitutional
power. It seeks to shed light on an oft-ignored but vital aspect of the
political safeguards debate: the process by which the political branches
enact legislation. By examining the structure of the political branches
and the incentives affecting actors in the national political process, one
can understand more completely how concerns about federalism enter
political debate, and the power these concerns wield relative to the
myriad other interests exacting concessions from Washington lawmak-
ers. This Note attempts to show that the political struggle for power
between the federal and state governments is insufficient to keep Con-
gress from exceeding the constitutional limits on its power established
by Article I. To trust the political process alone to guard that bound-
ary would be to abandon the notion that ours is a government of enu-
merated powers.
The argument unfolds in four parts. Part I discusses the theoretical
underpinnings of the political safeguards argument and demonstrates
that many of its foundational assumptions do not apply to the modern
political environment. Moreover, the political safeguards model con-
flates the protection of states' interests with the preservation of feder-
alism. Although the two concerns often converge, it is far from inevi-
table that the states will rally to oppose every instance of uncon-
stitutional federal action.
Playing upon that theme, Part II examines the avenues by which
federalism concerns enter national policy debates. Federalism acts
through three primary proxies in the political process: national political
actors who are beholden to federalism for ideological or instrumental
purposes; the intergovernmental lobby, federalism's natural and pri-
mary ally; and other lobbies that deploy federalism arguments strategi-
cally to further substantive policy goals. Each of these groups is moti-
vated by a distinct incentive structure that determines whether it will
defend federalism principles in any given policy debate. And even
when one or more of these proxies chooses to defend federalism, the
legislative process imposes structural impediments that can thwart its
success.
Part III adds an empirical gloss to this theoretical discussion by
analyzing in depth the political processes underlying the enactment of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The legislative history of the bill
struck down in Lopez illustrates how institutional incentives combine
to broaden Congress's power at the expense of the states, despite clear
and well-articulated federalism concerns of state and federal authori-
ties. The case study shows that national political actors may seek to
advance federalism yet may prove unable to intervene effectively to
protect state autonomy. In addition, although the intergovernmental
2005]
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lobby affords the states at least some power, the states are not always
interested in exercising that power to defend federalism. Finally, even
if some states are interested in protecting federalism, they are not al-
ways able to do so. Collective action problems and the costs of oppos-
ing politically popular bills may hamstring the intergovernmental
lobby in its attempt to curb congressional excess.
Finally, Part IV concludes with a brief discussion of the judiciary's
advantages as a backstop to federalism's political safeguards. The ju-
diciary is well-positioned to compensate for the weaknesses of the po-
litical branches when examining federalism principles: Whereas the
President and Congress encounter potential threats to federalism bun-
dled within larger legislative packages, the judiciary has the ability to
excise offending provisions without invalidating Congress's entire leg-
islative scheme. And the protections afforded by Article III insulate
judges from daily politics, allowing them to strike down laws that are
politically popular but which violate the Constitution. Judicial over-
sight creates a mutually reinforcing dynamic with the judiciary acting
when the political process fails, and in turn providing the constitu-
tional guidelines within which politics defines the boundary between
federal and state power.
I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF FEDERALISM'S
POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
On its surface, the political safeguards of federalism argument is
deceptively simple. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he title essen-
tially says it all.""5  When the Framers designed our system of dual
sovereigns, they did not rely solely on formal limits on federal power to
protect the states from the national government; they also assigned the
states a "strategic role in the selection of the Congress and the Presi-
dent," a role that gives the states tremendous "political power to influ-
ence the action of the national authority. '' 16 In eighteen brief pages,
Professor Wechsler outlined how these political safeguards operate,
spinning an argument that justified the Supreme Court's post-New
Deal abdication of judicially enforced federalism while reassuring fed-
eralism's proponents of the states' continuing political viability.7
In many ways, Professor Wechsler's paradigm-setting observations
were merely a modern gloss on an argument first posited by James
Madison. In the Federalist Papers, Madison argued that the states are
well-positioned to protect themselves from federal encroachment, be-
cause of both the role they play in the federal structure and the special
is Kramer, supra note 7, at 218.
16 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 544.
17 See Kramer, supra note 7, at 217.
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place they occupy in the hearts of their residents. 8 Madison's argu-
ment is rooted in the notion that "[t]he State governments may be re-
garded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government." 19
Because (under the original constitutional scheme) the state legislatures
chose the composition of both the Senate and the Electoral College
and defined those eligible to elect the House of Representatives, the
federal government "must consequently feel a dependence" upon the
states for its very being that would protect the states from excessive
regulation. 0 In addition, Madison argued, because "[t]he powers dele-
gated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined,"'" American citizens are far more likely to interact with
state government than federal government in their everyday lives.
22
As a result, they are more likely to identify with and to feel a greater
loyalty to their states than to the federal government.
23
The Antifederalists challenged the notion that the states would
wield substantial power over the federal government through the po-
litical process; fresh from the battlefields of the American Revolution,
they were loath to replace one tyrannical central government with an-
other. Brutus, the persuasive Antifederalist from New York, asserted
baldly that "[ilt appears . . . that there is no need of any intervention of
the state governments, between the Congress and the people, to exe-
cute any one power vested in the general government. '24  He also
doubted the efficacy of the textual limits on congressional power:
It is true this government is limited to certain objects, or to speak more
properly, some small degree of power is still left to the states, but a little
attention to the powers vested in the general government, will convince
every candid man, that if it is capable of being executed, all that is re-
served for the individual states must very soon be annihilated, except so
far as they are barely necessary to the organization of the general govern-
ment.
Is See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45-46, supra note 3.
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 3, at 291.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 292.
22 See id. at 291.
23 See id. at 291-93 (asserting that federal law would be "exercised principally on external ob-
jects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce," leaving to the states "all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people").
24 Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST o8, iio (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1985). The essays of Brutus are widely attributed to Robert Yates, although that at-
tribution is far from unquestioned. See Essays of Brutus, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at
103, 103.
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... The powers given by [Article I, Section 8] are very general and
comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the passing [of]
almost any law.25
Thus the states were not immune from Brutus's conclusion that "it is a
truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man,
and every body of men, invested with power, are ever disposed to in-
crease it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing that stands in
their way."'26
Although the Federalists won the day in 1787,27 by 1954, manyproponents of decentralized government feared that, with the New
Deal, the Antifederalists's worst fears had come to pass. 28  Professor
Wechsler sought to address this concern in his seminal article. Chan-
neling Madison into modern language, Professor Wechsler erected a
two-tiered argument that federalism receives adequate protection from
the political process alone.
First, Professor Wechsler noted that, contrary to Antifederalist pre-
dictions, the states continue to exist as political entities.2 9 The Consti-
tution was grafted onto a preexisting body of law rooted in the states,
which retained plenary power over matters not specifically granted to
the federal government. As a result, even when Congress seeks to act
clearly within an enumerated power, "those who would advocate its
exercise must none the less answer the preliminary question why the
matter should not be left to the states. '30 If there is no nationwide
demand for a unified response to a particular problem, "[t]he politicallogic of federalism" leaves the issue to the states, which are closer to
the specific population affected. 31
Second, Professor Wechsler argued that the states retain tremen-dous influence over the course of federal legislation through "their cru-
cial role in the selection and the composition of the national author-ity.''32 At the outset, "the composition of the Senate is intrinsically
calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that
25 Brutus I, supra note 24, at iio, 112.
26 Id. at 112-13. Brutus was hardly alone in his critique of the political safeguards Madison
proposed. See, e.g., Agrippa VI, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 24, at 238, 239 ("[T]he states are annihilated in reality upon receiving
this constitution 
- the forms will be preserved only during the pleasure of Congress."). Histori-
ans have widely concluded that Agrippa was James Winthrop. See Letters of Agrippa, I-XI, in
THE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 24, at 227, 227.
27 This victory, however, depended upon the important concession of the Bill of Rights, includ-ing the Tenth Amendment's reservation of an enclave of regulatory authority to the state govern-
ments. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.28 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. I, 23 (1950).
29 See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 544.
30 Id. at 545.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 546.
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dominant state interests wish preserved for state control. '33 Because
seats are apportioned by state, the twenty-five smallest states could
unite to stop federal action despite representing only nineteen percent
of the U.S. population; even fewer could stop treaties or constitutional
amendments. 34 State legislatures also exercise some power over the
House, by controlling state voter qualifications (at least, within the
confines of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments)
and congressional districting. 35 Professor Wechsler seemed less sure of
the power of the states to influence the President through their partici-
pation in the Electoral College; although his essay drifts off on a
lengthy tangent on Electoral College reform,36 he ultimately settles on
the notions that "the mode of [the President's] selection and the future
of his party require that he ... be responsive to local values that have
large support within the states" and that "his programs must, in any
case, achieve support in Congress" where the states exercise more di-
rect influence.37
Although persuasive at first glance, Professor Wechsler's analysis
suffers from a fatal flaw: the confusion of two analytically disparate
concepts, state interests and state institutions.38 As Professor Larry
Kramer notes, the ability of a handful of senators, representing a small
fraction of the American populace, to hamstring federal legislation
may "ensur[e] that national lawmakers are responsive to geographi-
cally narrow interests.'39 But this is very different from the purpose of
federalism, which is to protect "the integrity and authority of state po-
litical institutions" from federal preemption or other attempts to "dis-
place" state government.40 Farming interests may, for instance, control
a sufficient number of Midwestern state congressional delegations to
protect ethanol subsidies and limit federal regulation of farm equip-
ment, but their influence does not answer whether the Constitution
permits Congress to regulate in either field (nor does it answer the ana-
lytically distinct question whether ethanol is best regulated at the fed-
eral level while farm equipment is best left to individual states). Fur-
33 Id. at 548.
34 Id. at 547. These numbers were accurate as of 1954 and are not appreciably different today
- according to the most recent Census Bureau estimates, the smallest twenty-five states comprise
sixteen percent of the population. See POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL
ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, AND FOR
PUERTO RICO: APRIL I, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 (2004), http://www.census.gov/popest/states/
tablesINST-EST2004-0 .pdf.
35 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 548-52.
36 See id. at 553-57.
37 Id. at 558.
38 Kramer, supra note 7, at 22 1-22.
39 Id. at 222.
40 Id. at 225-26.
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thermore, the lure of congressional funding can incentivize the states
to welcome federalization of ever greater areas of the law, even if Arti-
cle I clearly marks the subject of the funding as beyond Congress's
regulatory power.
Because state interests do not always coincide with the protection
of state government, Professor Wechsler's carefully constructed model
collapses. Especially following the Seventeenth Amendment, the Sen-
ate becomes at most a vehicle for a minority of private interests to
forestall legislative action. 4 1 Similarly, the fact that the Electoral Col-
lege forces the President to consider the demands of several local con-
stituencies does not necessarily protect state institutional interests.4 2
Modern legal developments exacerbate Professor Wechsler's ana-
lytical flaw. Professor Wechsler himself recognized that the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the states' indirect control over the House of Rep-
resentatives by imposing restrictions on the states' ability to set voter
qualifications.43  Further federalization and constitutionalization of
voting rights since Professor Wechsler's time lead Professor Kramer to
conclude that it is "impossible to think of anything a state could do to
protect itself with this power today that would not be either unlawful
or ineffective. '4 4  Similarly, congressional and Court action have
"mopped up any lingering significance [of redistricting] for federal-
ism. '45  The collapse of the claim that the states have a structural
power over Congress also invalidates the claim that the President's
dependence upon Congress gives the states some advantage within the
executive branch.
Commentators have written ad nauseam about the flaws inherent
in Professor Wechsler's model, leading some scholars to consider
whether political safeguards might be rooted in elements other than
the formal structural relationship between the states and the federal
government. Professor Kramer, who serves simultaneously as Profes-
sor Wechsler's chief critic and intellectual heir, finds the political safe-
guards of federalism in American political parties. Because American
political parties are decentralized and lack discipline, national political
officials "will need to help state officials either as a matter of party fel-
lowship or in order to shore up the willingness of state officials to offer
41 Cf. id. at 224-25.
42 See id. at 225-26 ("But while this geographical dispersion may have benefits (and costs)
when the President sits down to define a national mandate, it does nothing to help state govern-
ments fend off preemptive federal legislation.").
43 See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 549.
44 Kramer, supra note 7, at 226.
45 Id. at 227 (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 197 3 bb-i (2000);
Shaw v. Reno, 5o9 U.S. 630 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613 (1982)).
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support in the future. '46  Consequently, "by linking the fortunes of
officeholders at different levels," political parties create "a mutual de-
pendency that induce[s] federal lawmakers to defer to the desires of
state officials and state parties," thus "protect[ing] the states by making
national officials politically dependent upon state and local party or-
ganizations. '47  Professor Kramer's theory, in turn, has attracted a
number of critics, who allege that the mutual dependency at the heart
of his analysis is more appropriately described as a one-way street in
which power and respect flow away from the states toward national
political organizations. 48
The efforts of Professor Kramer and others to resurrect Professor
Wechsler's largely discredited hypothesis stem from some intuition that
although Professor Wechsler's analysis may not have been sound, there
is something special about the states that gives them an advantage in
the political process. Indeed, despite the incredible growth in the
power of the federal government in the modern era, both absolutely
and relative to state power, Professor Wechsler is right that the states
have been preserved as "separate sources of authority and organs of
administration, '49 a fact that is "so immutable a feature of the system
that [its] importance tends to be ignored. °50 Most of the first-year law
school curriculum, including property, torts, contracts, and criminal
law - "[t]he law that most affects most people in their daily lives" -
is still "overwhelmingly state law."'5 '
Furthermore, from time to time, the political process functions pre-
cisely as Professor Wechsler predicts, with the political branches of the
national government acting independently to protect against the usur-
46 Id. at 279.
47 Id. at 278.
48 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 958-61 (2001) (arguing that political safeguards are insufficient to
prevent "vertical aggrandizement" by the federal government); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 5 1 DUKE L.J. 75, 112-17 (2ooi) (claim-
ing that Professor Kramer's safeguards - specifically the national government structure and po-
litical parties - are insufficient to prevent "vertical aggrandizement"); Saikrishna B. Prakash &
John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1459, 148o-89 (2oo1) (arguing that political parties are unable to fill the role of protecting
federalism).
49 Wechsler, supra note 3, at 543.
50 Id. at 544.
51 H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83
MINN. L. REV 849, 891 (I999) (alteration in original) (quoting Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (i994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also H.
Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 73, 126 (1997) (noting that despite dramatic changes following the Civil War and the New
Deal, "[f]ederal law remains . .. 'generally interstitial in its nature"' (quoting PAUL M. BATOR,
DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 533 (3d ed. 1988))).
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pation of state autonomy. For example, in 1987 President Reagan
signed Executive Order 12,612,52 which required executive agencies to
abide by certain enumerated principles when pursuing "policies that
have federalism implications ''S3 and mandated that the states be con-
sulted "[t]o the extent practicable" before any action that would "limit
the policymaking discretion of the States. '5 4 When President Clinton
revoked this order in 1998,55 Congress and the intergovernmental
lobby acted quickly to restore state power. The House held hearings
on the effects of this new order under the politically charged title
"Clinton-Gore v. State and Local Governments. '56 Representative Bob
Barr also sponsored the State Sovereignty Act of I998 s ' that would
have required agencies to continue abiding by Executive Order
i2,612.5s Across Capitol Hill, Senator Fred Thompson introduced the
Federalism Enforcement Act of I998, 59 which sought the same end.60
Neither bill passed, but the furor from Congress forced President Clin-
ton to reinstate most of the Reagan-era federalism protections. 6 1
The willingness of Representative Barr and Senator Thompson,
both national political figures, to protect state interests from executive
usurpation suggests that the political safeguards of federalism are alive
and well, despite the academy's inability to define them precisely. And
the continued existence of the states as the sources of "the law that
most affects most people in their daily lives" provides strong support
for trusting those political safeguards to protect state interests within
the confines of Congress's enumerated powers.
But the stakes rise substantially, and the sole dependence on politi-
cal safeguards becomes much more risky, when the focus shifts from
congressional lawmaking that is clearly within Article I to legislation
at the outer limits of Congress's authority. For it is a substantial leap
52 3 C.F.R. 252 (1987).
53 Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 253-54.
54 Id. § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. at 254.
55 Exec. Order No. 13,o83, § 7(c), 3 C.F.R. 146, 149 (1998). See generally Brian E. Bailey,
Note, Federalism: An Antidote to Congress's Separation of Powers Anxiety and Executive Order
13,083, 75 IND. L.J. 333 (2000).
56 Clinton-Gore v. State and Local Governments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Econ.
Growth, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, Io5th
Cong. (1998).
57 H.R. 4196, 1oth Cong. (1998).
58 Id. § 2(a).
59 S. 2445, Io5th Cong. (1998).
60 See id. pmbl. (stating that the bill's purpose was "[t]o provide that the formulation and im-
plementation of policies by Federal departments and agencies shall follow the principles of feder-
alism").
61 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (I999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi (200o); David
S. Broder, White House To Rewrite Federalism Order, Now with State-Local Input, WASH. POST,
July 29, 1998, at A19.
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from the observation that some form of political safeguards exists to
the conclusion that they should foreclose any judicial review of the
principles of federalism, as many of Professor Wechsler's disciples have
advocated. 62  To assess the analytical strength of this position, this
Note now turns to examining the paths by which federalism concerns
are injected into the legislative process.
II. PATHWAYS OF FEDERALISM'S POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
The academy struggles to identify and explain federalism's safe-
guards partially because its scholars focus their attention in the wrong
place. As Professor Elizabeth Garrett has deftly noted, most scholar-
ship examines the structures affecting national elections (the inputs)
and laws affecting the states (the outputs), while "largely ignoring the
process that transforms the inputs into legislation. '63  A thorough un-
derstanding of the political process is key to assessing the efficacy of
federalism's political safeguards. The states do not simply wave the
talisman of federalism to ward off any threat from national policy-
makers. Rather, federalism must be advocated by proxies who have
seats at the national lawmaking table. Federalism as a national politi-
cal policy rests precariously upon three such proxies: elected national
officials, the intergovernmental lobby, and other lobbyists. These ac-
tors' reasons for deploying federalism arguments, and the strengths
and weaknesses of their positions in the struggle to create federal pol-
icy, shed light on the potency of federalism's political safeguards.
A. National Political Actors
As the executive order saga shows, at times both executive and leg-
islative officials show concern for advancing the cause of federalism.
Their interests could stem from a genuine ideological devotion to de-
centralization and a belief in the values underlying the federalism
doctrine, 64 or they might represent more instrumental invocations to
62 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 8; Kramer, supra note 7.
63 Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Man-
dates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, '115 (I997).
64 See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution
Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 765-66 (2003) (explaining that the eight
Senators voting against a nonbinding Senate endorsement of teaching about the evolution-
creation controversy "did so on federalism grounds rather than because of any substantive dis-
agreement with the amendment[, as] ... [t]hose Senators were simply opposed to dictating educa-
tional policy to states and localities"). Professor Kramer suggests that because many national po-
litical officials have state government experience, they carry some federalism sympathies into
national office. Kramer, supra note 7, at 285. But see Michael B. Berkman, Former State Legisla-
tors in the U.S. House of Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery, 18 LEGIS. STUD. Q.
77, 95-96 (1993) (indicating more research is necessary to understand the effect of prior state gov-
ernment experience on national political officials' attitudes toward federalism).
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support specific policy objectives. 6  The strengths and weaknesses of
the two branches dictate the power that federalism wields when de-
ployed by these national political actors.
Because of his position in the legislative process, the savvy con-
gressman can raise issues of state autonomy and limits on congres-
sional power during debate, forcing other congressmen to consider
such issues when casting their votes. But each individual congressman
is just one in a multitude of legislators; preserving federalism requires
forging a consensus with other lawmakers, either through shared fed-
eralism norms or by enlisting support through vote trading. Further-
more, federalism is only one of the myriad policy concerns factored
into any individual bill, many of which are pushed by the special in-
terests that fund congressional campaigns. Since federalism is an in-
tangible policy objective,6 6 it can lose out when pitted against more
concrete goals. As a result, although an individual congressman might
strongly support a bill due to federalism concerns, structural barriers
could prevent him from forging a pro-federalism majority.
By comparison, the President is a unitary actor, capable of taking
direct action and unencumbered by the coordination problems that
congressmen face. But the President's ability to enforce federalism is
hampered by a different structural concern: "The Constitution limits
his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. '67 Like the Ei-
senhower Doctrine of "massive retaliation, '6 8 the veto power is a
sledgehammer that cannot easily assist in small battles. 69 Congress
has learned to avoid vetoes by submitting omnibus bills that combine
a variety of legislative provisions but allow only a single, binary presi-
dential decision. 0 These bills have raised the cost of enforcing federal-
65 See Matthew Schaefer, The "Grey Areas" and "Yellow Zones" of Split Sovereignty Exposed
by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation, and Intrusion To Escape
an Era of Misguided "New Federalism," 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 38 (i998) ("While one frequently
hears of federalism in political debates, politicians often use federalism as a rhetorical tool to ar-
gue for their underlying policy objectives (or perhaps the objectives of special interest groups)
rather than in the context of a debate over whether the values of federalism will be promoted by a
particular action.").
66 See Laura E. Little, Envy and Jealousy: A Study of Separation of Powers and Judicial Re-
view, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 102 (2000).
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
68 Massive retaliation was America's Cold War strategy to rely upon the threat of its nuclear
arsenal to achieve foreign policy ends. See John Foster Dulles, U.S. Sec'y of State, The Evolution
of Foreign Policy, Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. i2, 1954), in 3o DEP'T
ST. BULL. 107 (1954).
69 Cf. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Branches Behaving Badly: The Predictable and Often Desirable
Consequences of the Separation of Powers, i2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 543, 550 (2003).
70 See id. (describing the process of combining different provisions into one omnibus bill and
then daring the president to veto as "nuclear blackmail").
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ism: to invalidate one provision on federalism grounds requires
the President to pay the political price of rejecting a host of other
proposals.7 '
B. The Intergovernmental Lobby
The intergovernmental lobby is a loose coalition of more than sixty
organizations dedicated to representing state and local interests in
Washington.7 2 Prime among these are the "Big Seven": the Council of
State Governments, the International City/County Management Asso-
ciation, the National Association of Counties, the National Conference
of State Legislatures, the National Governors' Association, the Na-
tional League of Cities, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.7 3 Since its
advent in the mid-i96os, the intergovernmental lobby has proved a
useful tool for organizing state and local officials and for promoting
their policy interests.7 4
The intergovernmental lobby's primary advantage is its ability to
solve the collective action problem that affects state and local interests.
The organizations comprising the lobby offer significant benefits to
dues-paying members, thereby reducing free-riding by enticing state
and local officials to contribute to the common cause of lobbying in
Congress.7 5 As a result, the interests of their members hold more sway
in Congress than if each member were left to lobby Capitol Hill on its
own.
Although this advantage seems formidable at first blush, the inter-
governmental lobby suffers two drawbacks that hamper its lobbying
power: coordination and resources. As Professor Garrett notes, any in-
terest group could find itself unable to act if its members could not
agree on a single course of action.7 6 The intergovernmental lobby en-
compasses a wide range of groups that may be dedicated to federalism
principles in the abstract but break on specific policies. A federal law
enforcement grant to cities may undermine state autonomy yet receive
the support of the National League of Cities. Even within the state
lobby, a particular policy may affect different states in different ways,
hampering the ability of the National Governors' Association to take a
71 Cf. Robert Neal Webner, Note, The Intersession Pocket Veto and the Executive-Legislative
Balance of Powers, 73 GEO. L.J. 1185, 1215 (1985).
72 See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1121.
73 Id.
74 See Paul Chen, The Institutional Sources of State Success in Federalism Litigation Before
the Supreme Court, 25 LAW & POL'Y 455, 459 (2003).
75 See Garrett, supra note 63, at I122.
76 Id. at I123.
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consensus position on an issue.7 7 As Professor David Dana explains,
"[f]or rich states and localities, the effective cost of an unfunded man-
date may be less than the cost of federally funded regulation; for poor
states and localities, the converse is true."78
Even when the intergovernmental lobby can unite behind a policy,
its efforts have no guarantee of success. Although the political safe-
guards of federalism may give the intergovernmental lobby an advan-
tage vis-A-vis other lobbyists, political compromise among a variety of
disparate interest groups still determines national policy. The inter-
governmental lobby's success turns upon its ability to offer legislators
something valuable in exchange for their support, above and beyond
what the opposing side offers.7 9 Like any other interest group, the in-
tergovernmental lobby must expend limited political capital in a way
that maximizes its own interests. When a bill has few practical conse-
quences or enjoys the support of strong lobbies, the intergovernmental
lobby may find itself unable or unwilling to fight it, even though the
bill might be an egregious violation of the principles of federalism.
C. Other Lobbies
Occasionally, interest groups have adopted federalism arguments
instrumentally to support their substantive policy goals. One prime
example is the employment of federalism arguments in opposition to
the Brady Bill80 by the gun rights lobby.8 1 Such instrumental argu-
ments can help the cause of federalism by providing ready allies on
certain issues. But because their support is issue-specific rather than
principled, the power they lend the federalism cause is sporadic and
they cannot be counted as consistent allies.
The above analysis raises concerns about a regime that relies solely
on the political process to enforce the constitutional limits of congres-
sional power. Although one would expect the states, through the in-
tergovernmental lobby, to advocate strongly for federalism principles,
this lobby may find that at times it cannot or will not take a stand on
an issue. Even when it does fight for federalism principles, it could
lose the battle among lobbyists for influence. Other lobbies might or
might not support the federalism cause, depending on the underlying
77 Cf Baker, supra note 48, at 955-56 (noting the effects of "horizontal aggrandizement" - the
ability of a majority of states to use the federal apparatus to force their policy preferences upon a
minority).
78 David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 26
('995).
79 See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1124.
80 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, tit. I, 107 Stat. 1536 (i993)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of i8 and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (I997).
81 See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1130-31.
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politics of the issue. And although national elected officials might turn
a sympathetic ear to federalism arguments, they may prove structur-
ally unable to uphold state autonomy.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act represents a case when the politi-
cal process failed to prevent Congress from engaging in extraconstitu-
tional legislation. The next Part examines the progression of the bill,
the considerations of national elected officials regarding its effects on
state institutions and Congress's limitations under the Commerce
Clause, and the limited role played by the intergovernmental lobby
and other lobbies in curbing congressional excess.
III. LOPEZ AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
States' rights do not get in the way when someone has something he
wants to do .... Liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans - they
just go whoosh.82
A. Legislative History
The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 made it a federal offense
for "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm" within one thou-
sand feet of a school zone.8 3 It was introduced in response to a "shock-
ing number" of incidents of violence against children within the school
environment. 84 In his introduction of the bill, Senator Herb Kohl
highlighted three school shootings in the preceding two years, followed
by several statistics regarding the number of handguns in schools and
a short description of the bill.85 In the House, Representative Edward
Feighan introduced an identical bill; he did not make a speech but in-
serted into the record a statement similar to that of Senator Kohl. 6
The Senate held no hearings on the bill. 7 The Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary did hold hearings on
the House version of the bill, in which a number of special interest
groups, government agencies, and professional associations, including
the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence, the National Education As-
sociation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF),
testified regarding the importance of federal action to curb school gun
violence. 88 The hearings served primarily to arm congressmen with
82 Broder, supra note 61 (quoting Rep. Bernard Sanders, a former mayor of Burlington, Vt.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
83 Pub. L. No. IOI-647, § 1702(b)(1)-(2), 104 Stat. 4844, 4844-45.
84 136 CONG. REC. iI65 (I99O) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
85 Id.
86 See 135 CONG. REC. 30,665 (1989).
87 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3 d 1342, 1359 (5th Cir. i993).
88 See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199o: Hearing on H.R. 3757 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ioist Cong. (I99O) [hereinafter Hearing].
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statistics regarding handgun possession and violence in schools - sta-
tistics later deployed on the floor to support the bill and other federal
crime control measures.8 9 Although the hearings were by no means
secret,90 only one representative of state or local government appeared
before the committee - the Chief of Police of Cleveland, Ohio - who
sought and received an exemption from the bill for police officers
whose duties would otherwise cause them to violate the law.91
Despite an extensive hearing and numerous statements in both
chambers supporting the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the implications
of the bill for state autonomy and for the constitutional limits on Con-
gress's authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause attracted
very little attention. 92 The only explicit considerations of federalism
concerns in the legislative history are an admission by BATF Firearms
Division Chief Richard Cook that "the source of constitutional author-
ity to enact the legislation is not manifest on the face of the bill"93 and
an observation by Representative William Hughes to Cook that the
bill would be a "major departure from a traditional federalism concept
which basically defers to State and local units of government to en-
force their laws. '94
Neither the committee nor either chamber of Congress ever pur-
sued Representative Hughes's point, and the bill was eventually
passed as part of the omnibus Crime Control Act of i990.9 5 When the
bill was sent to the White House, President Bush noted that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act provision "inappropriately overrides legitimate
State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The
policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by
the States, but they should not be imposed upon the States by the
Congress. ' 96 Despite these reservations, the President signed the bill
89 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 24,505 (i994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("[A]ccording to the
National Education Association, more than ioo,ooo students pack a gun with their school things
every morning. Our response was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199o which prohibits the
possession of firearms within i,ooo feet of a school.").
90 See 136 CONG. REC. DIo52 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 199o) (announcing the time and location of
the Subcommittee on Crime's hearings on H.R. 3757).
91 See Hearing, supra note 88, at 24-27 (testimony of Police Chief Edward P Kovacic); Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, iii HARV. L.
REV. 2 io, 2238 & n.251 (1998) (noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was modified follow-
ing Kovacic's testimony to include his requested exception).
92 See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-6o.
93 Hearing, supra note 88, at io.
94 Id. at i4; see Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Politi-
cal Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 766 (1996) (discussing the
exchange between Rep. Hughes and Cook).
95 Pub. L. No. ioi-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of io, ii, I2,
18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, 42, 46, and 49 U.S.C.).
96 Statement on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1715, 1715 (Nov. 29,
1990).
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into law on November 29, I990.9 ' Its enactment then became the sub-
ject of a split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 98 the resolution of
which in Lopez is the stuff of federalism legend.
Assuming that the Court correctly determined that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act lay beyond Congress's power to regulate commerce,
the central question posed by this legislative history is why the politi-
cal safeguards of federalism failed to prevent this congressional intru-
sion into the purview of the states.99 Only a few national political
leaders stopped to question the limits of congressional authority or the
proposition that the Act might infringe upon the states, and those who
did so failed to correct the problem. The intergovernmental lobby
likewise did almost nothing to raise these concerns. The legislative
dynamics of the Gun-Free School Zones Act show that political safe-
guards alone are inadequate to prevent Congress from exceeding its
constitutional authority, a finding that suggests the need for judicial
patrolling of the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers.
B. National Political Actors
Two theories potentially explain the failure of the national political
branches to police the limits of their own power. The first might be
dubbed "an act of omission": the notion that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act raised constitutional concerns simply did not occur to Con-
gress. Under this view, the pre-Lopez Court's willingness to uphold
even wholly intrastate noncommercial activity as within the commerce
power'00 suggested to Congress that little lay beyond the scope of the
clause, and therefore that it was not necessary for Congress to consider
seriously whether it had the power to enact the statute. Through this
lens, substantive judicial review plays a necessary role in policing the
outer boundary of congressional power: decisions like Lopez are shots
across the bow to remind Congress that it is still a body of enumerated
97 Professors Ruth Colker and James Brudney note that "[t]he President did not refer to his
concerns as constitutional; given his oath to uphold the Constitution, one can presume he would
not have signed the bill if he had genuine constitutional concerns." Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, ioo MICH. L. REV. 8o, 96 n.75 (2001). Of course, given the political
dynamics discussed in this Note, such faith in presidential fortitude may be unfounded.
98 Compare United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 292 (9 th Cir. 1993) (finding the Gun-Free
School Zones Act a permissible exercise of the Commerce Clause power), with United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3 d 1342, 1367-68 (5 th Cir. 1993) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act beyond Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce).
99 Alternatively, if one believes that the Court was incorrect, the fact that Lopez was a 5-4 de-
cision suggests that the Act's legality is at least debatable; given that the issue was a close one, it
remains noteworthy that the political safeguards of federalism did not force Congress at least to
consider seriously whether the Constitution required that the issue be left to the states.
100 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (942) (upholding a federal law regulating
personal consumption of home-grown wheat).
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powers and that it must find a constitutional basis for each statute it
enacts.
A second, more cynical theory suggests that Congress consciously
chose to disregard state interests and any potential constitutional con-
cerns. Professors Lynn Baker and Ernest Young argue that according
to the economic theory of regulation, politicians obtain political sup-
port in exchange for providing government benefits and services. 10'
Because they seek to maximize their own power, national politicians
are therefore likely to view state and local officials as competitors in
the market for political contributions. 0 2  Courts and commentators
more disposed to this view have argued that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was little more than an effort to ensure that federal officials
got some credit for helping solve a problem weighing on the collective
mind of the American public - and the value of that effort to law-
makers outweighed the costs it imposed on state autonomy. 0 3
By the time Lopez was briefed to the Supreme Court in 1994, forty
states had passed laws prohibiting gun possession near schools. Most
of these laws had been enacted before Congress took action in 1990,
meaning that the Act was in reality little more than a statement of fed-
eral encouragement. 0 4 Following the Court's invalidation of the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, President Clinton suggested that Congress
should "encourage States to ban guns from school zones by linking
Federal funds to enactment of school zone gun bans. °1 0 5  Instead,
Congress chose to reenact the Gun-Free School Zones Act, with con-
gressional findings addressing the connection between the prohibited
act and interstate commerce and with a jurisdictional hook to satisfy
the Lopez test. 0 6 As Professor Baker notes, "a conditional grant of
federal funds is the only way for Congress to achieve precisely the
regulatory effect that it originally sought with the Gun-Free School
Zones Act";07 reenacting the Act with a federal jurisdictional hook
would not capture all cases falling under the mandate of the original
bill. But Congress's goal may have been to ensure that federal prose-
cutors get credit for convictions - or merely to make a symbolic
statement - rather than to prevent all gun possession near schools. In
that case, the reenactment of § 922(q) makes more sense despite the
101 Baker & Young, supra note 48, at 114.
102 See id. at 112-17.
103 See id. at 114-15 (citing United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 366 (N.D. Ala. i993)).
104 See Brief for Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-126o), 1994 WL 16oo76i9, at *3
n.2.
105 The President's Radio Address, i PUB. PAPERS 61o, 611 (Apr. 29, I995).
106 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2o0o).
107 Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1913
n.8 (1995).
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jurisdictional hook preventing the Act from reaching as broadly as the
original Gun-Free School Zones Act. 108
Even the national political actors who neither failed to realize nor
consciously disregarded the Act's implications for federalism could not
vindicate the political safeguards of federalism. The inability of Rep-
resentative Hughes and the unwillingness of President Bush to correct
what they aptly perceived as glaring constitutional problems are re-
markable. The inaction within both branches was rooted in the politi-
cal realities of the statute. The political and practical cost of imposing
the Act on the states was trivial in light of the fact that most states
had already outlawed guns in school. By comparison, opposing the
Act would have been politically difficult - both the anti-gun lobby
and the education lobby had campaigned hard for the measure. For
either Representative Hughes or President Bush, the political cost of
continuing to argue that less protection of children was preferable to
more would have been high.10 9
For President Bush, structural influences raised those costs higher.
The Gun-Free School Zones Act was one part of a i8o-page bill on
crime, a political issue close to voters' hearts. A presidential veto
would have invalidated Congress's comprehensive crime control
scheme in order to remedy a small provision that was both politically
popular and practically harmless. Thus, it is troubling for the theory
of federalism's political safeguards yet unsurprising from the perspec-
tive of structural and political realities that President Bush signed the
bill, casting aside whatever constitutional doubts he harbored.
C. The Intergovernmental Lobby
The political dynamics underlying the Act suggest three potential
explanations for the intergovernmental lobby's similar failure to chal-
lenge its enactment. First, the states may simply have lacked the in-
terest to challenge the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act. As noted above, the overwhelming majority of states had already
adopted state laws prohibiting possession of firearms near schools. For
those states, sharing jurisdiction with the federal government
helps achieve greater compliance with state possession bans without
108 The congressional findings in the reenacted version suggest a less self-serving explanation:
they assert that "[s]tates, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle gun-
related crime by themselves." 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q)(i)(H). This line suggests that, notwithstanding
federalism concerns, Congress may have felt that this infringement was necessary because state
regulation alone was inadequate.
109 The Gun-Free School Zones Act necessarily provided more protection since it did not pur-
port to preempt state laws against the possession of guns in school zones. Rather, the Act simply
made such possession a federal crime as well; it was an exercise of concurrent authority to regu-
late in this area.
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increasing state outlays for law enforcement.11o From this standpoint,
every case prosecuted under § 922(q) is one more gun out of the state's
school system, removed at the federal government's expense. Fur-
thermore, those states obviously agreed with the substantive policy
underlying the Gun-Free School Zones Act; they had no practical rea-
son to oppose the ban as applied to themselves and might also have
seen no problem with foisting it upon noncompliant states.' Profes-
sor Baker dubs this phenomenon "horizontal aggrandizement" of fed-
eral power at the expense of the states. 2 Since a majority of states
shared the federal government's interest in keeping guns out of the na-
tion's schools, the intergovernmental lobby was unlikely to check Con-
gress's attempt to act outside the scope of its enumerated powers.
Second, even if the intergovernmental lobby had adequate incen-
tives to combat the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it may have lacked
the political capital to do so. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in
which the cards are stacked more heavily against the states. The issue
of gun violence in schools is itself a politically volatile issue; a strong
presumption exists for the position that more protection of children is
preferable to less. In addition, two strong national interest groups sup-
ported the Act: the anti-gun lobby and the education lobby. The inter-
governmental lobby's interests are diffuse, spanning any number of
potential congressional acts in a given year. It may have decided to
sacrifice any interest it had in maintaining constitutional limits on
congressional power in this case, choosing instead to expend its limited
political capital on less volatile measures with weaker opposition, so as
to maximize its overall influence on federal policymaking.
Finally, one might assert that the intergovernmental lobby did act
to oppose the Gun-Free School Zones Act, but simply failed to secure a
division between federal and state power equivalent to the Constitu-
tion's textual limits. As noted above, Cleveland's police chief lobbied
110 Cf Garrett, supra note 63, at 1123 ("Local officials may be united in their concerns about
federalism principles, but they will also be concerned with programmatic goals and practical ob-
jectives that may clash with such principles.").
111 The findings included in the post-Lopez incarnation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act sug-
gest that states that had school zone bans harbored some animosity toward those that did not:
"[E]ven States, localities, and school systems that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and
punish gun-related crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of
other States or localities to take strong measures." i8 U.S.C. § 922(q)(i)(H). It is not readily ap-
parent how the failure of one state to ban guns in or around schools affects other states' enforce-
ment of their own bans, meaning that this finding is little more than a congressional swipe at
states without school zone gun bans.
112 See Baker, supra note 48, at 955-56 ("Here, the federal political process threatens state
autonomy insofar as that process is the means by which a majority of states may impose their
own policy preferences on a minority of states with different preferences. The federal political
process may therefore in certain circumstances threaten the autonomy of only some states, while
arguably enhancing the autonomy of other states.").
for and secured an exception to the Act for police officers acting in the
course of their ordinary business. Although the intergovernmental
lobby lacked the political power to stop the Act entirely, it was able to
wield its influence over this narrow area of the Act's enforcement,
when the lobby was on strong ground and when the concerns of op-
posing lobbies were weak. As a result, the intergovernmental lobby
was at least able to protect local control of police procedure - a tradi-
tionally quintessential function of local government. 
1 13
Rather than a rigid constitutional barrier, the line drawn by the po-
litical process between federal and state power depends largely upon
the issue being debated, the array of special interests assembled on
each side, and the extent to which federalism concerns coincide with
the substantive interests of the intergovernmental lobby. Perhaps the
political process can be trusted, despite its potential deficiencies, to de-
termine just how much Congress's enumerated powers should be exer-
cised on a given issue. This Note takes no position in that context.
But when Congress seeks to enact legislation at the outer boundary of
its constitutional power, the political power of the states and their al-
lies in the federal government is insufficient to ensure that Congress
does not exceed its constitutional authority.
IV. FEDERALISM PROTECTIONS THROUGH
JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS
The failure of the political process to confine Congress to its consti-
tutionally defined powers is unsurprising. American society looks to
the political process to determine which policies are wise, and it relies
upon the judiciary to ensure that those policies are legal. It is appro-
priate, indeed vital, for the Court to conduct substantive judicial re-
view of legislative policies to correct the rare instances of congressional
overreaching.
The judiciary has precisely the tools that the political branches lack
to fight extraconstitutional action like the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
Although Congress and the President must consider a potentially un-
constitutional provision only as part of a larger bill, the Court can sur-
gically remove the provision from the statutory framework, allowing
for an analytically clean review. And Article III's tenure and salary
protections insulate the judiciary from political pressure, meaning that
considerations whether the provision is politically popular or even ob-
jectively good policy need not cloud its constitutional analysis.
What results is a mutually reinforcing division of labor between
federalism's political and judicial safeguards. The intergovern-
113 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
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mental lobby and sympathetic national political actors catch the most
egregious violations of federalism - federal encroachment upon state
autonomy that constitutes bad policy and therefore fails to command
popular support, or that usurps state power significantly enough to
motivate the intergovernmental lobby to take action. Judicial action
checks those provisions that slip through the political safeguards be-
cause they are too popular or practically harmless. That judicial ac-
tion, in turn, reinforces the normative assumption that Congress
should act only within its enumerated powers, giving the proponents
of federalism additional ammunition for the next round of political
combat.
Professor Wechsler promised a self-policing federal government
that could be entrusted to stay within its constitutional boundaries.
But the political realities of the legislative process show that political
checks are imperfect at best. And as Justice Powell noted in his Gar-
cia dissent, the Court does not trust such political protections of consti-
tutional rights in other contexts:
One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is com-
posed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are
amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted today
is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an essen-
tial part of the Bill of Rights.' 14
Justice Kennedy has agreed, noting that federalism is "the unique
contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory."115
Its textual provisions may be difficult to enforce judicially, but "com-
merce" is no less justiciable than "unreasonable search" or a host of
other individual rights that the Court has enforced through elaborately
constructed doctrines.116 Garcia's judicial abdication created a struc-
ture whereby the interstate commerce limitation on Congress's power
is effectively defined as the balance of interests between the states and
those that would oppose them, with no connection to commerce what-
soever. When the political safeguards fail, such a scheme leaves no re-
course to prevent Congress from assuming a general police power at
the expense of the Tenth Amendment. The judiciary's responsibility to
"say what the law is15117 must prevent it from conducting such a dan-
gerous sacrifice of constitutional principles in the name of judicial
convenience.
114 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.8 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
115 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (i995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
116 Cf Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and
Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 365 (I99O) (criticizing the Court's readiness
to enforce individual rights but not the separation of powers).
117 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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